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ABSTRACT. I propose a reading of Iris Murdoch’s A Word Child and show how her
novel resonates with important themes in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Inves-
tigations, as read by Stanley Cavell, such as the idealization of language. I highlight
the ethical significance of such an idealization.
1. INTRODUCTION
I would like to propose here a few thoughts about the novel A Word Child, published
by Iris Murdoch in 1975.
A Word Child is a first-person narrative about Hilary Burde, a poor orphaned child,
who grew up lonely and unloved. He was subjected to violence, and was becoming
violent himself, when a schoolteacher spotted him as a gifted child, and made him
discover languages. Hilary learned how to write his own language, English, then pro-
ceeded to Latin, French and Italian. Discovering the order of grammar gave him his
first vision of order and beauty: this vision allowed him to rise above the violence and
disorder around him. Eventually his love for grammar led him up to a famous univer-
sity, where he became a Fellow. (( I discovered words)), writes Hilary, ((and words were
my salvation)).
But A Word Child is not a fairy tale, and after a catastrophic love affair which ended
in a scandal, Hilary resigned from his University position and took a job indifferent to
his talents: at the beginning of the novel, the reader finds Hilary stuck in this job, and
presenting himself as a failure. It seems that words did not save him afterall, or that
he could have been saved but for something that was still lacking. Why salvation did
Date: October 11th 2019.
Conference given at The Iris Murdoch Conference, Amiens, 2019.
1
2 LAYLA RAÏD
not happen and what was lacking in Hilary’s first love for words and their order, is a
problem the reader has to solve while reading the novel.
A few years before the publication of A Word Child, a very similar problem was
given a philosophical expression by Iris Murdoch, in a conference she delivered in
New York, on this very subject of salvation by words. This latter expression is the
title of the conference, then reprinted in Existentialists and Mystics. The conference
has a political tone: it underlines how tyranny degrades language, and it states that,
with no doubt, the art which is (( the most practically important for our survival and our
salvation)) is literature. Murdoch writes that (( ( . . . ) words are the ultimate texture and
stuff of our moral being, since they are the most refined and delicate and detailed ( . . . )
of the symbolisms whereby we express ourselves into existence)) [7, p. 241].
The novel, A Word Child, could be seen as a literary exploration of this idea of
salvation by words. This novel is one way to explore what it could mean. Let us
note that Murdoch uses two different expressions in the words I just quoted from her
article: ((survival)) and ((salvation )). One belongs to the empiricist way in philosophy
about which Murdoch declares that it is not sufficient for ethics, but she still considers
it contains something valuable enough to be conserved; the other word belongs to
the christian and theological vocabulary, but it is stripped of the social background
that gave it its sense1. So, in the profane context of modern life, the use of the word
((salvation)) has to be explored and rebuilt: the novel can be read as such an exploration,
where the fictitious character of Hilary Burde provides a secularized setting for the
word. And, interestingly, a setting where he deems himself not saved. At least at the
beginning of the novel.
Since a kind of salvation is seen as essential to the work of literature by Murdoch, it
would be interesting to find other works in modern literature that could be described in
the terms of a salvation by words. Each of these works would depict different kinds of
relations to words. It would be interesting too to see which philosophical works would
answer to this description. I would like to show here how A Word Child resonates
with ordinary language philosophy works, especially with Wittgenstein’s philosophical
works. We could see Wittgenstein as another word child, a word child of a certain
kind, who may have been an inspiration for the character of Hilary Burde. But I will
not make any historical guess; I will propose rather to bring together the novel and
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, with the idea that each work sheds light
on the other.
In the first part of my talk, I will present some elements of Hilary Burde’s story:
how words were special for him, how he admired the order of language, and what
could have been missing here.
In the second part, I will come to Wittgenstein and to the path he followed from
the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations. In the Philosophical Investigations,
1Cf. Camille Fort, ((Le Dieu caché d’Iris Murdoch)) [4]: the article analyses the tensions produced
in Murdoch’s work by her desire to retain christian and theological vocabulary in her novels and philo-
sophical texts (in particular to retain the word ((God )) itself), in spite of her agnosticism.
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Wittgenstein says of the Tractatus that it is a work which sublimes language: it ex-
plains its apparent disorder by a logical order which is supposed to be underneath the
apparent form of proposition. Logical analysis was supposed to unveil this hidden or-
der. But the distinction between the apparent form and the real form of language is
abandoned in the Philosophical Investigations as mythological: Wittgenstein asks the
philosopher to come back to the rough ground of language, to real words, as they are
used in their actual contexts, in an innumerable variety of ways. In the Philosophical
Investigations, Wittgenstein tells his own story of how he came back from the temp-
tation to see language as something pure and orderly to a sober examination of the
innumerable, unclassifiable, different language-games in which we talk.
This would show us a way to answer my question about what was missing in Hilary’s
first love for words, and why he looked for salvation in a place where he could not find
it: our words are not logical; our language-games are innumerable; our language is
first of all ordinary, evolving in a relative disorder and a relative mess. Language is
like an old medieval town, it is nothing similar to neatly designed suburbs. These do
exist, but they are not to be confused with the whole town. Hilary’s first love consisted
in this confusion, as the Tractatus vision of language was. Hilary’s first love was more
precisely an illusion, necessary for his survival, but to survive is not to live, and to live
he had to give up his old vision.
The salvation by words Iris Murdoch refers to in her article is one which accepts the
words in their relative disorder, and in their endless differences.
2. WHO IS HILARY BURDE ?
Let us come back to Hilary Burde and to his attempt to save himself through the
study of words and their grammar.
Hilary Burde is an anti-hero, an underground man, as he describes himself. After
his mother’s death, he lived in an orphanage, separated from his beloved sister Crystal.
He did not know who his father was:
I was informed, before I knew what the word meant, that my mother was a ‘tart’.
[8, p. 17]
This is the harsh way to understand that our moral being is made of words. The sen-
tence sums up in a few words the small child’s status in language: before mastering
their own language, they are the impotent objects of gossip. Children are talked about
in every way before being able to say anything for themselves: they are the object of
description, and become authors of descriptions concerning themselves much later, if
at all. Salvation was needed here, and it seems that it was not only salvation by words
that was needed, but salvation from words. And the first because of the second: violent
words must be fought with other words. Hilary found these other words at school,
under the protection of Mr Osmand.
Mr Osmand, a schoolteacher, was the first adult to remark Hilary’s talents, and the
first adult to care about him:
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The realization that people had simply given up trying to teach me anything en-
lightened me at last, more than the lectures from magistrates, about how utterly
shipwrecked I was; and increased my anger and my sense of injustice. For with
the dawning despair came also the tormenting idea that in spite of everything I was
clever, I had a mind though I had never wanted to use it. I could learn things, only
now it was too late and nobody would let me. Mr Osmand looked at me quietly. He
had grey eyes. He gave me his full attention. [8, p. 21]
Hilary describes their relation as nourishing and creative. The child was saved by
his master’s attention and their common and shared attention for words: he was Mr
Osmand’s spiritual son. This is expressed in his being a ((word child)).
I learnt French. I learnt Latin. Mr Osmand promised me Greek. An ability to write
fluent correct Latin prose began to offer me an escape from (perhaps literally) the
prison house, began to show me vistas headier and more glorious than any I had ever
before known how to dream of. In the beginning was the word. Amo, amas, amat
was my open sesame, ‘Learn these verbs by Friday’ the essence of my education;
perhaps it was mutatis mutandis the essence of any education. ( . . . ) I discovered
words and words were my salvation. I was not, except in some very broken-down
sense of that ambiguous term, a love child. I was a word child. [8, p. 21]
Words gave him a vision of something higher. More precisely, Hilary’s admiration
went to grammar: words appeared to him as a certain order, as belonging to grammat-
ical systems. So one aspect only of words were given to him: order ! And this order
appeared to him as worthy of his respect.
Moreover this order could be consistently obeyed: it was reliable. And this relia-
bility offered him something he never had before. Something which allowed him to
counteract the effect of violence, to resist violence.
Violence is a kind of magic, the sense that the world will always yield. When I
understood grammatical structure I understood something which I respected and
which did not yield. The exhilaration of this discovery, though it did not ‘cure’ me,
informed my studies and cast on them a light which was not purely academic. [8,
p. 22]
Murdoch uses here the vocabulary she uses to describe moral vision in the Sovereignty
of Good. An idea of the Good was given to Hilary through the study of grammar.
Reality was given to him through the experience of obedience to the master and, at the
same time, through the experience of obedience to their common object of attention:
words.
But Hilary the narrator is conscious that something was missing in this relation
of admiration and respect, precisely because what he admired and respected was the
order that was missing from his own life. He did not use the languages that he learnt.
After playing on words with the expression ((a word child)), the narrator crafts another
expression, which signifies this partial, disengaged relation to words: a word-watcher.
He admires words, but at a distance.
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I loved words, but I was not a word-user, rather a word-watcher, in the way that
some people are bird-watchers. I loved languages but I knew by now that I would
never speak the languages that I read. I was one for whom the spoken and the written
words are themselves different languages. [8, p. 28]
In his study of languages, Hilary was not interested in people, and their linguistic
interactions. He was not interested in the fact that their lives were made of words, but
he was interested in words abstracted from theses lives, and built into systems.
3. WITTGENSTEIN AS A WORD-WATCHER
I propose to see Wittgenstein as another word child, one who similarly came back
from a failed salvation by words in the Tractatus to the recognition of what salvation
could really be in the Philosophical Investigations: one can see Wittgenstein’s philos-
ophy as going from word-watching to realism.
In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein reassesses his first work by show-
ing how it was under the illusion that language was a perfect order, behind the ap-
pearences. He recalls how language appeared to him as something pure and superior,
as having the purity of crystal — Hilary’s terms are of the same kind. We find in the
salvation sought by Hilary the same temptation of subliming language that Wittgen-
stein sees at work in his former treatise on logic:
94. ((A proposition is a queer thing!)) Here we have in germ the subliming of our
whole account of logic. The tendency to assume a pure intermediary between the
propositional signs and the facts. Or even to purify, to sublime, the signs themselves.
— For our forms of expression prevent us in all sorts of ways from seeing that
nothing out of the ordinary is involved, by sending us in pursuit of chimeras. [9,
§94]
Ordinariness was precisely not what Hilary needed to escape the ugliness and violence
of the orphanage; he would return to ordinariness, but at the end of a long journey,
which the novel recounts. In his school years, and his studies afterwards, his salvation
depended on the greatness of the order he was discovering. The price to pay was that
this sublimity left real words, in their real use, outside his attention. The use of words
was not a subject of reflection. Words were treated as magical creatures. As such,
they were bound to lose the reality that first allowed Hilary to escape from violence
and disorder: because it was sublimed, their order was bound to lose its reality, and its
appeal.
In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein compares words with crystals,
when he describes his first relation to words in the Tractatus:
97. Thought is surrounded by a halo. — Its essence, logic, presents an order, in
fact the a priori order of the world: that is, the order of possibilities, which must
be common to both world and thought. But this order, it seems, must be utterly
simple. It is prior to all experience, must run through all experience; no empirical
cloudiness or uncertainty can be allowed to affect it — It must rather be of the purest
crystal. ( . . . ) This order is a super-order between – so to speak – super-concepts.
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Whereas, of course, if the words (( language )), ((experience)), ((world )), have a use,
it must be as humble a one as that of the words (( table)), (( lamp )), ((door)). [9, § 97]
As Wittgenstein describes the conflict created by this first relation, a conflict between
the requirement of crystalline purity and actual language, he calls the philosopher back
to the ordinary uses of words:
107. The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the
conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of
course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes
intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty. — We have got
on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions
are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so
we need friction. Back to the rough ground! [9, §107]
For Hilary, it was vital and life-saving that grammar should be a reliable order. But
what saved him from prison (or worse) was at the end an illusion. The novel depicts
the difficulty of the way back to reality.
Now Crystal is Hilary’s sister’s name. She completely exists for him, and him for
her. Her name shines for him. But she is not an illusion, she is plainly real. And
Murdoch depicts her as the apparent contrary of a crystal; she gives her a heavy plain
body. Crystal embodies the ordinariness Hilary has to come back to, another image of
love:
Let me try to describe Crystal. She cannot be said to be beautiful. She was short
and dumpy, she had no perceptible waist. She had pretty small well-worn capable
hands ( . . . ) She had a large mouth with a prominent moist lower lip, very mobile.
Rather bad teeth. ( . . . ) Her eyes were hazel, of the kind which are pure golden
without a hint of green, but they were usually hidden behind thick round spectacles
which made them look like gleaming stones. None of this really describes Crystal
however. How is it possible to describe someone to whom you are oned in love ?
[8, p. 14]
In §111 Wittgenstein underlines the depth of the word-watcher’s illusion. He sug-
gests this depth to his reader, but passes then to another question. This is the kind
of place where a novelist could begin a story, and the kind of place where Murdoch
would have considered perhaps that philosophical writing is not powerful or expressive
enough, and that it should give way to literature:
110. ((Language (or thought) is something unique)) – this proves to be a superstition
(not a mistake!), itself produced by grammatical illusions.
And now the impressiveness retreats to these illusions, to the problems.
111. The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language
have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in
us as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance
of our language. — Let us ask ourselves: why do we feel a grammatical joke to be
deep ? (And that is what the depth of philosophy is.) [9, §110-111]
The ideas of a word child and of a word-watcher are such grammatical jokes, which
have philosophical depth.
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4. THE ORDINARY LANGUAGE MAN
I come now to some elements in Murdoch’s philosophy that may seem to go contrary
to this reading of Wittgenstein as a former word child, trying to find his salvation in
words, the real words of ordinary language, where crystals should be searched for and
found.
In her 1959 article, ((The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited)), Iris Murdoch de-
scribes two strands of contemporary philosophy she connects with ((symptoms of de-
cline in contemporary literature)) [7, p. 267]: existentialism and linguistic empiricism.
She describes the latter as associated with (( the tradition of Moore and Wittgenstein))
[7, p. 267]. One of Murdoch’s objection to this inheritance of Wittgenstein’s philos-
ophy is that its picture of the moral agent, being conventional and behaviouristic in
spirit, is incapable of approaching the complexity of moral life.
The ((Ordinary Language Man )), as she calls this construal of the moral agent, is
((a being subject to rules )), surrounded by (( the network of ordinary language )), under-
stood as (( the network of moral conceptual activity at its more common and universally
accepted level)) [7, p. 268]. With this picture we turn ((away from the chaos of empiri-
cal inwardness )) to (( the clarity of overt action)) [7, p. 268]. For the Ordinary Language
Man, (( [even] the presence of others is felt, if at all, simply as the presence of ratio-
nal critics)) [7, p. 268]. As a consequence, concludes Murdoch, this version of the
moral agent is incapable of understanding virtue, which is essentially a concern not
with actions or rules or reason, but with (( really apprehending that other people exist ))
[7, p. 284].
Murdoch sees this appeal to convention as a surrender when faced with the difficulty
of understanding how each of us makes place for the other in our life. The orderliness
and rationality of convention plays the role of an intellectual shield against the disrup-
tive character and turmoil of human encounters. This disruption and turmoil are at the
center of both Murdoch’s philosophical works and novels.
In The Sublime and the Beautiful revisited, she describes convention as the enemy
of love and understanding:
One might say that whereas the Ordinary Language Man represents the surrender
to convention, the Totalitarian Man of Sartre represents the surrender to neurosis:
convention and neurosis, the two enemies of understanding, one might say the ene-
mies of love; and how difficult it is in the modern world to escape from one without
invoking the help of the other. [7, p. 268]
How does this link to the word child? Hilary Burde shares one thing with this
creature of convention: an idealization of language, an irrealistic recoil from its ac-
tual variety and messiness. There are different ways to fantasize the order of ordinary
language: the Ordinary Language Man is one of them. It is the fantasy that human
beings could have convened to build something common to resolve the most important
disagreements in advance — as if we could have come to some general agreement be-
forehand to answer Socrates’ question to Eutyphro: ((But what kind of disagreement,
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my friend, causes hatred and anger ? )). (Stanley Cavell puts this question as an epi-
graph to his essay on the perlocutory aspect of language, ((Passionate and Performative
Utterances)) [3, p. 155]: the perlocutory is notoriously disorderly and messy !)
Now, this Ordinary Language Man is not Wittgenstein’s language-user. As Cavell
showed in the Claim of Reason [2], the image of human beings as creatures of con-
vention that Murdoch finds in some works inspired by Wittgenstein is precisely what
Wittgenstein (and Austin) tried in fact to avoid, while feeling at the same time the
temptation to picture human beings in such a way.
The linguistic empiricism Murdoch opposes is linked with an early reception of the
Philosophical Investigations, one that Cavell opposes too, stating that it is a misun-
dertanding of Wittgenstein’s vision of language [2]. Interestingly, Murdoch’s criticism
of conventionalism is consonant with the interpretation of Wittgenstein defended by
Cavell. The critique Murdoch opposes to the first Ordinary Language Man leads her
to the moral themes of this second reception, that developed well after linguistic em-
piricism (roughly, from the 1970s on).
Thus, in criticising the ((Ordinary Language Man)), Murdoch comes closer in fact
to Wittgensteinian conceptions2. And A Word Child is a novel where Murdoch comes
closer to Wittgensteinian themes.
5. CONCLUSION
As a conclusion, I would like to point to another theme in the novel which can be
linked fruitfully to Wittgenstein’s philosophical method.
All along the Word Child, another novel is woven into its narrative: Peter Pan. In
his introduction to the Vintage edition of A Word Child, Ray Monk, who is the author
of an important biography of Wittgenstein [5], proposes an interpretation of the role of
Peter Pan in the novel. Peter Pan is the master of make-believe, and his main tool is
language. Let me quote, for example, the passage where Peter Pan and the Lost Boys
are playing doctor. ((Please, sir)), said Peter, going to Slightly, one of the Lost Boys,
((Are you a doctor?)):
The difference between [Peter Pan] and the other boys at such a time was that they
knew it was make-believe, while to him make-believe and true were exactly the
same thing. This sometimes troubled them, as when they had to make-believe they
had had their dinners. [1, p. 79]
Monk shows how the risk of a salvation by words is that the word-watcher is entangled
in his or her own linguistic imagination. Words can be veils that create illusions, as
well as tools to pursue the truth. What was missing in Latin was the language-games
in which Latin words were used: but that was all the point for young Hilary.
Monk does not refer to Wittgenstein in his introduction. But it is an interesting result
of Murdoch’s novel that Peter Pan and Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations,
2See Murdoch’s ((Wittgenstein and Inner Life )) in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals [6]: the last
pages of this article acknowledge the presence of a voice in Wittgenstein which is at variance with
the voice of convention. Murdoch sees it particularly present in the second part of Philosophical
Investigations.
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two works that seem to belong to very different worlds, do illuminate each other in the
end.
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